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Abstract  
Prohibiting land reallocation improves tenure security, but it remains unclear whether 
this sufficiently facilitates the development of farmland rental markets in China. To 
fill this gap, we investigate how farmland rental activities are influenced by full-scale 
land reallocation (FSLR) and partial land reallocation (PLR), which differ in scale 
and imposition. Employing the instrumental-variables and the difference-in- 
differences approaches, we find that PLR substitutes relation-specific contracting in 
the markets, while FSLR complements arms-length contracting. The different 
impacts are attributable to the difference in imposition rather than scale. These 
findings suggest the need for further reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
The relation between plan and market has been a long-standing concern for formerly 
centrally planned economies. This is particularly true for land markets in China, in 
which common land rights have been retained even after significant transitions toward a 
market-oriented economy. While land rental markets in China have historically been 
limited, their importance has steadily increased since the mid-1990s, following the 
growth of off-farm labor markets. Accordingly, the Chinese government has 
increasingly restricted administrative land reallocation (e.g., the Rural Land Contract 
Law in 2002) in order to develop land rental markets without privatizing land rights. 
However, while it is well known that restricting land reallocation heightens tenure 
security and thus land-specific investments (Bai et al. 2014; Deininger and Jin 2003; 
Jacoby et al. 2000; Li et al. 1998; Prosterman et al. 1996), it is still unclear whether such 
restrictions actually facilitate the development of land rental markets (Figure 1). 
Although some studies find that administrative land reallocation and land rental market 
are substitutes (Kiumra et al. 2011; Brandt et al. 2004), others find that they might be 
complements (Kung 2002; Yao 2000).  
To better clarify the impact of restricting land reallocation on land rental markets, 
this paper investigates in more detail the relation between administrative land 
reallocation and land rental market transactions by distinguishing between two modes of 
land reallocation: full-scale land reallocation (FSLR) and partial land reallocation (PLR). 
FSLR affects every farm household and the plots previously assigned to them by the 
village community, regardless of demographic change, and PLR is based primarily on 
familial demographic change. Although the two modes are rarely distinguished in 
previous studies, recent evidence shows that FLSR and PLR have opposite associations 
with land rental market transactions (Che 2014). Such counterintuitive opposite 
associations cannot be explained by the substitute or complement hypotheses
1
. It 
remains unclear whether these associations are causal, and if so, why they have opposite 
impacts on land rental market transactions.  
                                                          
1Given the substitute relation, FSLR (i.e., reallocating more land) should reduce land 
rental market transactions more than PLR does. In contrast, given the complementary 
relation, FSLR should increase land rental market transactions more than PLR does. 
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This paper attempts to fill this gap by providing an estimate of the impacts of 
FSLR and PLR on land rental market transactions employing instrumental-variable (IV) 
and difference-in-differences (DID) approaches. It also investigates in more detail the 
mechanism behind their impacts. The paper first identifies the impacts of two modes of 
land reallocation (FSLR and PLR) on farmland rental market transactions by applying 
the IV approach over a unique set of farm survey data that allows us to differentiate 
FSLR from PLR. The results show that while PLR and the rental market are substitutes, 
FSLR and the rental market are not; FSLR has an apparently positive or insignificant 
impact on rental market transactions. The findings suggest that the inconsistent previous 
findings may be attributable to conducting estimations without distinguishing between 
the different modes of land reallocation.   
Moreover, these counterintuitive findings lead us to a second question: why do 
FSLR and PLR have opposite impacts on land rental market transactions? To 
understand this, we focus on two key aspects—scale and imposition—that distinguish 
between FSLR and PLR. While scale is conventionally used to distinguish between 
FSLR and PLR, we additionally examine the imposed nature of some cases of FSLR as 
compared with that of others, which are largely conducted on a voluntary basis.
2
 To 
identify the impact of imposed FSLR on farmland rental market transactions, we apply a 
DID approach over two-period panel data that distinguishes between imposed and 
voluntary land reallocation during 1995–1999. The results clarify that the observed 
difference between the impacts of FSLR and PLR is attributable to the imposed nature 
of FSLR rather than to the larger scale of FSLR. Our results also suggest that 
households affected by an imposed FSLR might have been forced to contract with those 
on an arms-length basis, whereas voluntary land reallocation mostly affects relation-
specific contracting in the rental markets.  
Lastly, we explore why imposed FSLR may increase land rental market 
transactions. We first develop a conceptual framework in which reallocation and the 
rental markets are connected through inefficiency in farmland allocation within a village. 
                                                          
2
 During 1995–1999, township authorities instructed some villages to reallocate land 
from scratch (i.e., full scale), due to a policy promulgating villages to extend household 
farming for another 30 years upon the expiry of their initial 15-year lease (e.g., taking 
effect in 1997 if de-collectivization occurred in 1982). 
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To empirically verify the framework, we construct a measure of inefficiency in 
farmland allocation within a village, following the approach proposed by Ravallion and 
Walle (2006). The results demonstrate that imposed FSRL creates the greatest 
inefficiencies in farmland allocation, and correcting for such inefficiencies results in an 
increase in farmland rental market transactions. In contrast, voluntary land reallocation 
(including voluntary FSLR and PLR) has either an insignificant effect or a beneficial 
effect of better matching the demand for land by a household’s farm labor, where the 
result is a lower level of farmland rental market transactions.  
Our findings shed important light on China’s recent land policy reforms aiming 
at facilitating the development of land rental markets by strictly prohibiting FSLR while 
sanctioning PLR.
3
 First, our findings suggest that land rental market transactions are 
much less sensitive to the scale of land reallocation, as compared to land-specific 
investments. Thus, while prohibiting FSLR improves tenure security and land-specific 
investments, it may not facilitate the development of land rental markets. Second, given 
that PLR and rental markets are substitutes, prohibiting PLR might actually stimulate 
more farmland rental market transactions. However, in rental markets, land reallocation 
largely influences relation-specific contracting rather than arms-length contracting. 
Because arms-length contracting is a better proxy for the development of land rental 
markets, it appears that the Chinese government needs further reforms to land rights 
toward the direction of increased private ownership.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out our data and 
descriptive analysis of the relation between land reallocation and farmland rental market 
participation in China. Section 3 examines the causal effects of FSLR and PLR on 
farmland rental market transactions. Section 4 further investigates whether the observed 
difference between the effects of FSLR and PLR is attributable to differences in scale or 
imposition. Section 5 explores why imposed FSLR may increase farmland rental market 
transactions. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of China’s land policy in terms of 
developing farmland rental markets.     
 
                                                          
3
 PLR is still widely conducted in China, though recently less frequently (Wang et al. 
2011; Kong and Unger 2013). For example, the 2006 China General Social Survey 
shows that about 10% of sampled households have experienced PLR even after 2003.  
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2. Administrative Land Reallocations and Farmland Rental Markets in China  
2.1 Data 
To describe the background and conduct the empirical analysis, we use data from a 
2003 survey organized by the Development Research Center (DRC), a powerful 
research and policy arm under China’s State Council. The sample comprised 98 villages 
in 48 townships in 12 counties in 6 provinces (Anhui, Fujian, Heilongjiang, Hunan, 
Sichuan, and Zhejiang). About 20 farm households were selected randomly from each 
village’s roster for the household survey.   
This survey collected information on the history of land reallocation since de-
collectivization (around 1978–2002), namely the type of reallocation (full-scale versus 
partial), the number of times and the specific years in which a village reallocated land, 
and the reasons for implementing the most recent FSLR. The survey also recorded 
farmland and household sizes before and after the latest administrative land reallocation 
(either FSLR or PLR). In addition, the survey enumerated a number of variables 
pertaining to farmland rental behavior of the surveyed households, including whether 
they participated in the demand or supply side in the farmland rental market, the extent 
to which they have done so, and with whom they contracted. Moreover, given that 
rental market transactions are intimately linked to the development of the off-farm labor 
market, households were also asked to provide detailed information on their 
involvement in the labor market. Finally, the survey enumerated many variables at both 
the household and village levels, ranging from socioeconomic to production 
characteristics. 
Our analytical sample contains 2,028 household observations from 96 villages. 
Seventy-five households were dropped from the original sample. Specifically, two 
villages (24 households) were dropped because they did not report key characteristics, 
and 51 households were dropped because they did not report key household 
characteristics for our analysis. We found no systematic pattern of missing information 
among the households. 
 
2.2 Descriptive Analysis  
Administrative land reallocation in China can be classified into two modes by scale: 
PLR, and FSLR. PLR takes place in response to changes in household demand for 
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farming land following demographic changes (due to births, deaths, and marriages), and 
it is common that a negatively affected household in PLR is obligated to transfer only 
one of its several plots to another household. In FSLR, households not only fail to be 
exempted from the reallocation even though they are not affected by demographic 
changes, but also are unable to retain any of the plots they currently cultivate.  
First, we describe the distribution of FSLR and PLR across villages and 
households. At the village level, 28 villages conducted only FSLR, 24 villages 
conducted only PLR, and 45 villages conducted both FSLR and PLR. However, at the 
household level, the majority of households participated in only one mode of land 
reallocation: 51.8% participated in only FSLR and 25.8% participated in only PLR. 
Additionally, 14.4% of households have never been affected by land reallocation over 
the period from de-collectivization until 2002, which is possible because even when a 
village conducted a land reallocation, some households within the village might not 
have been affected by the reallocation. In our sample, only 8.0% of households were 
affected by both FSLR and PLR. These facts may indicate that the mode of land 
reallocation is endogenously selected, depending on village and household 
characteristics (e.g., village topographies).   
Second, we describe the relation between the frequency of land reallocation and 
the proportion of households participating in the farmland rental market. Table 1 shows 
that whereas only 7.6% of those who had experienced PLR four times or more had 
rented land, 25.4% of those who had experienced FSLR with comparable frequency did 
so. Our conjecture is further strengthened by the finding that households that have never 
reallocated land do not significantly differ in farmland rental activity (12.2% in panel 1 
versus 16.6% in panel 2). This descriptive evidence supports our conjecture that FSLR 
and PLR have different impacts on land rental market transactions.  
 In contrast, the supply side of the farmland rental market shows virtually no 
difference between those who frequently engaged in FSLR (12%) versus PLR (9.1%) 
insofar as rent-out decisions are concerned. This may be because, as previous studies 
found, rent-out activities are dominantly determined by off-farm labor opportunities 
(Kimura et al. 2011; Deininger and Jin 2009; Zhang et al. 2004). In fact, our empirical 
analysis also found that land reallocation has insignificant effects on land rent-out 
activities, though the results will be suppressed for simplification. Moreover, we have 
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concerns about the data quality for land rent-out activities. Compared with the data for 
rent-in land, the data for rent-out land may be less trustworthy because the people who 
rent out their land tend not to stay in the village and thus were not interviewed in the 
survey. Therefore, the following sections focus on the demand side of the farmland 
rental market.    
Lastly, we describe the relation between the mode of land reallocation and the 
contractual parties in the land rental market. Table 2 summarizes the contractual parties 
from whom households rent farmland (the first panel) and how the land contract is 
certified (the second panel) across the household groups that participated in different 
modes of land reallocation. Overall, we find no systematic difference across the 
household groups, and there are two important patterns for all the groups. First, the 
majority of land transactions occurred within a village (that is, the first four parties 
account for 92.6%). Among all households who are renters of farmland, 37.8% of them 
rent land from relatives within their villages, 29.1% rent land from non-relatives within 
their villages, 17.9% of them rent land from village leaders, and 7.8% of them rent land 
mediated by a village committee or village cadres. Second, more than 76% of land 
contracts are certified only verbally without any written certificate. Only 15% of land 
contracts are certified by a written certificate in the rental markets.  
 
3. Effects of FSLR and PLR on Farmland Rental Market Transactions 
To empirically test our conjectures, we estimate the causal impacts of FSRL and PLR 
on land rental market transactions by employing the IV approach.  
 
3.1 Identification Strategy 
We start from the following basic model: 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ = G(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ + 𝛽𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟 𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟ℎ + 𝜷𝑿
′ 𝑿 + 𝜇ℎ + 𝜇𝑣 + 𝜀),  
 (1) where 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ is the extent of farmland rental market transactions, 
𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ and 𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟ℎ are the respectively frequencies of FSLR and PLR that household h has 
experienced since de-collectivization, X is a vector of other household and village 
characteristics, 𝜇ℎ and 𝜇𝑣 represent unobserved factors that may influence farmland 
rental market transactions at both the household and village levels, and 𝜀 is the error 
term. 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ is represented by two distinct variables, (i) an indicator of 
7 
 
participating in the land rental market (𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ) and (ii) the size of farmland transferred in 
the rental market (𝑎ℎ). Our key analytical interests are the partial effects of 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ and 
𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟ℎ(𝛽𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟 and 𝛽𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟), which represent the total effects of FSLR and PLR on farmland 
rental market transactions, respectively. The vector X includes the control variables for 
three aspects that may affect farmland rental market transactions: (i) households’ 
agricultural ability, (ii) off-farm employment and income opportunities, and (iii) costs 
arising from undertaking farmland rental transactions.
4
       
Similarly, to examine the effect of land reallocation on the choice of contractual 
parties in the land rental market, we replace the dependent variable in Equation (1) with 
the farmland rental market transactions contracted with each of three contractual parties: 
relatives (rel), village leaders (vl), and other non-relatives (nrel). Then, we examine the 
effects of FSLR and PLR on the choice of contractual parties by specifying the 
following equation:  
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ
𝑝 = G(𝜋0
𝑝 + 𝜋𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟
𝑝  𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ + 𝜋𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟
𝑝  𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟ℎ + 𝝅𝑿
𝒑 ′
𝑿 + 𝜇ℎ + 𝜇𝑣 + 𝜀),  
 (2) 
where 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎ℎ
𝑝
 is the extent of farmland rental transactions contracted with party p 
(= rel, vl, or nrel). The explanatory variables are the same as those in Equation (1).  
As a benchmark, we employ a probit model when 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ is used in Equation (1) 
and a Tobit model when land size is used in Equations (1) and (2).
5
 However, there are 
good reasons to suspect that unobserved factors may be correlated with the explanatory 
                                                          
4
 We include ln(per capita household income), the share of agricultural income in 
overall income, household size, the proportion of household members in the workforce, 
the share of female household members, the share of household members who have 
received agricultural training, the characteristics of the household head (education level, 
age, whether an official), per capita arable farm size, ln(the value of agricultural assets), 
the share of off-farm workers in a household, the share of household members who have 
received non-agricultural training, ln(the value of non-agricultural assets), distance to 
the nearest prefecture, the share of households participating in the farmland rental 
market at the village level, and ln(agricultural tax). 
5
 𝑎ℎ is left-censored at zero. In our sample, 85% of households have not rented in any 
land, and 90% have not rented out any land. 
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variables. First, the choice of the modes and frequency of land reallocation may be 
affected by unobserved village characteristics such as topography. Also, within the 
control variables X, off-farm labor participation may be connected to farmland rental 
activity through the unobserved nature of transaction costs for participating in the 
farmland rental market. Thus, we instrument the potential endogeneity of nflr, nplr, and 
off-farm labor participation. We employ the IV approach combined with the province-
level fixed effects to control for household- and village-level unobserved factors (the so-
called IVFE model).
6
   
We now describe our excluded instruments. Suppose there are n villages within 
a county. We construct an instrument for village v by taking the average of a village 
characteristic over all of the surveyed villages within the same county except for village 
v itself (an average over (n – 1) villages). We obtain four excluded instruments by 
applying this (n – 1) strategy to four village characteristics: the average number of plots 
farmed per household (village topography), the average number of crops cultivated 
(cropping patterns), the share of off-farm workers, and the average income level of off-
farm workers. We expect that these four factors will be closely related beyond village 
boundaries and thus correlated with village v’s land reallocation and off-farm labor 
market activity. In contrast, we expect that these (n – 1) averages are not directly 
correlated with farmland rental market transactions within village v, because farmland 
rentals are often restricted within village boundaries. Although these assumptions 
cannot be tested directly, descriptive statistics support the assumptions. For example, in 
our sample, only 2.7% of the rent-in households rented in land from outside their 
villages, while 35.8% of off-farm workers work outside their villages.  
 
                                                          
6
 First, because all of our excluded instruments in the IV estimation are village-level 
variables, we are unable to incorporate village-level fixed effects into the IV estimation. 
Second, we employ province-fixed effects instead of province dummies due to high 
correlations between province dummies and other explanatory variables (the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) of the six province dummies ranges from 2.21 to 11.66, 
compared to the average VIF of 2.03), province-level fixed effects approach (the VIFs 
of the de-meaned variables now range from 1.05 to 2.31, compared to the average VIF 
of 1.32). 
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3.2 Estimation Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results from identifying Equations (1) and (2). The first panel 
presents the effects of land reallocation on the probability of participating in the 
farmland rental market, the second panel presents the effects on the size of farmland 
transferred in the rental market (mu), and the third panel presents the effects on the 
choice of contractual parties. Standard errors in basic models are clustered by village 
and thus allow for intra-village correlations.    
Before presenting the main results, it is worth discussing the empirical 
examination for the validity of excluded instruments in our IVFE models. First-stage 
estimations for IVFE models are summarized in Appendix A. The excluded instruments 
are jointly significant at the 5% level in all of the first-stage regressions. Also, the signs 
of the coefficients on the excluded instruments follow our expectations.
7
 In addition, the 
over-identification tests fail to reject the null hypothesis in almost all of the models 
(with p-values ranging from 0.27 to 0.75). An exception is the IVFE model, which 
estimates the area of the land rented out (the p-value is 0.02). The Hausman test rejects 
a null hypothesis that the FE and IVFE coefficient estimates are identical. Although the 
results do not guarantee the validity of our instruments, they do not rule out the 
possibility that the IV models may reduce the potential endogeneity bias. 
The results from the probit and Tobit models show that both the probability of 
renting in land and the size of land rented in are positively associated with the frequency 
of FSLR and negatively associated with the frequency of PLR (Table 3, column 1). The 
corresponding IVFE models show that the negative effect of PLR on the probability and 
the land size remain unchanged even after we control for potential unobserved factors 
and reverse causality (column 3). For example, with each additional PLR, the 
                                                          
7
 The (n – 1) average of the number of crops within a village increases the frequency of 
PLR; a village is more likely to choose PLR if the village’s cropping patterns are more 
complex. The (n – 1) average of the number of plots per household (an average farming 
scale) decreases the frequency of PLR and increases the frequency of FSLR. This is 
consistent with expectations, because an average farming scale tends to be larger in flat 
areas than in mountainous areas, and topographies are simpler in flat areas. Lastly, both 
the (n – 1) averages of off-farm income and share of off-farm workers within a village 
increase the share of off-farm workers within a household. 
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probability of renting in land decreases by 26.4% and the size of land rented in 
decreases by 3.4 mu. In the third panel, Tobit models show that an additional FSLR 
increases the rent-in land size contracted with relatives by 0.27 mu and that contracted 
with non-relatives by 0.18 mu, while an additional PLR decreases the rent-in land size 
contracted with relatives by 0.24 mu. However, these effects become statistically 
insignificant once we employ IVFE models. Lastly, using the total number of land 
reallocations without distinguishing between FSLR and PLR like in previous studies 
(TLR models), we find no significant effects of land reallocation. This indicates the 
importance of distinguishing between different modes of land reallocation.  
In summary, we find that FSLR and PLR have opposite impacts on land rental 
market transactions. However, the opposite impacts cannot be explained by the scale 
difference, although the magnitude of the impact may differ by the scale of land 
reallocation. Thus, to better understand the finding, the following section examines the 
role of another confounding factor that distinguishes between PLR and some FSLR.  
 
4. Why FSLR and PLR Have Opposite Impacts on Land Rental Market 
Transactions  
In this section, we examine whether the observed difference between the effects of 
FSLR and PLR is really attributable to the different scales of land reallocation by 
examining other confounding factors.  
 
4.1 Imposed FSLR during 1995–1999 
We are particularly concerned about the fact that the incidents of some FSLR were 
imposed rather randomly during 1995–1999,8 while the modes of land reallocation were 
                                                          
8
 This was because of a new policy in 1998 mandating local governments to stop 
reallocating land on a full-scale basis. Local (township and above) authorities that 
intended to follow this new mandate thus instructed villages under their jurisdiction to 
reallocate land from scratch one last time, because the first contractual period (of 15 
years) was supposed to end between 1995–1999, depending on when de-collectivization 
occurred (typically 1979–1984). During that period, more than half of the villages that 
conducted FSLR reported that doing so was imposed by higher authorities.  
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voluntarily selected by villagers during normal periods. Thus, we conjecture that the 
positive impact of FSLR might be attributable to the imposed nature of some FSLR.  
To investigate this possibility, we estimate the causal impact of imposed FSLR 
on farmland rental market transactions by employing a DID approach. We exploit the 
fact that some FSLR were exogenously imposed by the higher authorities during 1995–
1999. To examine the exogenous imposition, Table 4 compares mean village 
characteristics between villages that experienced imposed FSLR and those that 
experienced only voluntary land reallocation. In addition to nominal means (upper 
panel), it also presents means after controlling for province effects (lower panel).
9
 Table 
4 shows that while the nominal means of village size and share of off-farm workers are 
significantly different between the groups, all the mean differences become insignificant 
once we control for the province effects (column 3). In other words, within a same 
province, the villages that experienced imposed FSLR are not systematically different 
from the other villages. This indicates that the nominal mean differences are dominantly 
explained by the province effects rather than the mode of land reallocation. It is also 
worth noting that each province contains at least one village that experienced imposed 
FSLR and one that experienced only voluntary land reallocation.  
Moreover, Table 5 compares mean household characteristics across households 
affected by imposed FSLR, only voluntary land reallocation (only voluntary LR), and 
no land reallocation (No LR) after de-collectivization. Table 5 tests the differences 
between No LR and imposed FSLR households (column 4) and the differences between 
No LR and only voluntary LR households (column 5). For simplification, we 
suppressed nominal means. Comparing No LR and imposed FSLR households, 
differences in all household characteristics except for LR experiences and farmland 
                                                          
9
 Imposed FSLR were implemented unequally across provinces because agricultural 
provinces like Anhui and Heilongjiang were more eager to impose FSLR to consolidate 
household farming than were less agricultural provinces like Zhejiang. Thus, differences 
in nominal means can be due to provincial differences rather than the modes of land 
reallocation. To demonstrate this possibility, we present the means when controlling for 
province effects, regressing each variable on province dummies, and computing 
residuals. The residuals are used to compute the means in which province effects are 
partially corrected.  
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rental activity become insignificant once we control for province effects (column 4). In 
contrast, the means of the share of off-farm workers and arable land size per capita are 
significantly different between No LR and only voluntary LR households, even after 
controlling for province effects (column 5). These results support our expectation that 
the voluntary LR regime considered household conditions such as land size and off-
farm workforces, but such conditions were considered much less under the imposed 
FSLR regime.  
 
4.2 Identification Strategy 
We apply the DID approach over household-level two-period panel data. The panel data 
are constructed using information about farmland sizes, land rental market transactions, 
and household sizes before the most recent land reallocation and in 2002 (or in 1995 
and 2002 for No-LR households). The timing of the most recent land reallocation varies 
by village, and the longer the period after the most recent land reallocation is, the closer 
the dynamic process converges to a long-run equilibrium. Thus, our model controls for 
the length of the period between 2002 and the most recent land reallocation (or 1995 for 
No-LR households). To make the three groups more comparable, as implied in Tables 4 
and 5 we also include province dummies to control for regional variations in farmland 
rental market transactions. Because FSLR was imposed in or after 1995, we focus on 
those households that were affected by either FSLR or PLR only in or after 1995.   
To examine how imposed FSLR influences farmland rental market transactions, 
we compare between households affected by imposed FSLR and those never affected by 
land reallocation (LR) by excluding households affected only by voluntary LR. 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎ℎ = G(𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟 𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ + 𝛼𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟ℎ + 𝛼𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ ∙ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟ℎ        (3) 
                           +𝛼𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑ℎ + ∑ 𝛼𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣 + 𝜏)  
Here, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎ℎ is the size of farmland transferred in the rental market, 𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ is an 
indicator that equals 1 if household h is affected by imposed FSLR and 0 if never 
affected by LR, 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟ℎ is an indicator that equals to 1 if the outcome is observed in 
2002 and 0 if observed before the imposed FSLR (or in 1995 for No-LR households), 
𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ ∙ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟ℎ is the interaction term between 𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ and 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟ℎ, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑ℎ is the length 
of the period between the imposed FSLR and 2002 for household h, and 𝐷𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the household lived in province prov. The coefficient of 
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interest is 𝛼𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠, which should be positive if our conjecture is supported. Also, 
comparing 𝛼𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 with the corresponding IV estimate for the impact of FSLR (𝛽𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟), 
we can clarify the role of the imposed nature compared to the full-scale nature.  
Similarly, we also examine how imposed FSLR influences farmland rental 
activities in a different manner from voluntary FSLR, conditional on participation in the 
land rental market (excluding households never affected by LR). 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎ℎ = G(𝜃0 + 𝜃𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟2 𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟2ℎ + 𝜃𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟ℎ + 𝜃𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟2ℎ ∙ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟ℎ     (4) 
                           +𝜃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑ℎ + ∑ 𝜃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣 + 𝜏)  
Here, 𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟2ℎ is an indicator that equals 1 if a household h is affected by imposed FSLR 
and 0 if affected only by voluntary LR. The coefficient of interest is 𝜃𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠, which 
should be positive if our conjecture is supported.     
Lastly, similar to Equation (2), we examine the effects of imposed FSLR on the 
choice of contractual parties in the rental market by specifying the following equation: 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎ℎ
𝑝 = G(𝛼0
𝑝 + 𝛼𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟
𝑝  𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ + 𝛼𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑝  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟ℎ + 𝛼𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑝 𝑖𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ ∙ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟ℎ  
 (5) 
              +𝛼𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
𝑝  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑣 + 𝜏
𝑝).            
Here, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎ℎ
𝑝
 is the size of land contracted with party p (= rel, vl, or nrel).  
 
4.3 Estimation Results 
Overall, our estimation results indicate that the positive impact of FSLR observed in 
section 3 is mostly explained by the imposed nature of FSLR rather than the full-scale 
nature. Table 6 summarizes the results from the DID approach by identifying Equations 
(3) and (4) (columns 1 and 3). The coefficient estimate on the interaction term 
(iFSLR*After) indicates that being affected by imposed FSLR leads renter households 
to rent more land compared to being affected by no LR or only voluntary LR (column 1). 
These results are robust even after we add the vector of other control variables X to 
Equations (3) and (4) (columns 2 and 4), although the control variables are available 
only in 2002 and fixed at the 2002 values in two periods. For example, households 
affected by imposed FSLR rented in 1.49–1.76 mu more land than households never 
affected by land reallocation, and rented in 1.55 mu more land than households affected 
only by voluntary land reallocation (columns 1 and 2).    
14 
 
Table 6 also presents estimates for the impact on the choice of contractual 
parties by identifying Equation (5). It shows that imposed FSLR influences the choice 
of contractual parties differently from voluntary ones. Households affected by imposed 
FSLR rented in 0.77 mu more land from relatives and 0.54 mu more land from non-
relatives, compared to households affected by no land reallocation. Similarly, 
households affected by imposed FSLR rented in 0.60 mu more land from relatives and 
0.47 mu more land from non-relatives, compared to households affected only by 
voluntary land reallocation.  
Moreover, we specify Equation (1) for two sub-samples, one that has never 
experienced imposed FSLR and one without households who have experienced only 
voluntary FSLR. The results are summarized in the last panel of Table 6. We find that 
the frequency of FSLR has an insignificant impact on land rent-in activity (0.005) 
among those households that have never experienced imposed FSLR (columns 1 and 2), 
whereas the effect is three times larger and statistically significant (0.014) among those 
households that have experienced imposed FSLR (columns 3 and 4). These findings 
provide additional evidence that the positive impact of FSLR is attributable to the 
imposed nature of FSLR rather than the full-scale nature. 
 
5. Why Imposed FSLR Increases Land Rental Market Transactions 
5.1 Conceptual Framework 
To understand why imposed FSLR increased land rental market transactions, we seek 
clues from the fact that imposed FSLR tended not to consider household conditions 
compared to voluntary land reallocation. This fact leads us to conjecture that imposed 
FSLR are more likely to create more substantial inefficiencies in farmland allocation 
across households than do voluntary ones. The larger inefficiencies may in turn create a 
larger scope for readjusting inefficiencies through the land rental market, which 
increases farmland rental activity. In contrast, we conjecture that voluntary land 
reallocation may decrease inefficiencies and thus decrease the scope of land transfers 
through the land rental market.  
To describe our conjecture more formally, we construct a conceptual framework 
that illustrates how land reallocation affects farmland rental market transactions. We 
write a measure of the extent of farmland rental market transactions for household h, 
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𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ, as a function of a measure of the extent of inefficiencies in farmland 
allocation (𝜏ℎ = 𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴)), which is a mismatch between a desirable land size (𝐿ℎ
∗ ) and 
an allocated land size (𝐿ℎ
𝐴), and the vector of other factors that affect farmland rental 
activities such as transaction costs, 𝑋ℎ:   
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ = 𝑓ℎ(𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴), 𝑋ℎ).        (6) 
We expect that households with a larger extent of inefficiencies involve larger land 
transactions through the farmland rental market (
𝜕𝑓ℎ(.)
𝜕𝜏ℎ(.)
> 0). Now consider the impact 
of an administrative land reallocation on farmland rental activity. Totally differentiating 
Equation (1), this impact approximately equals   
∆𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ|𝐿𝑅 =
𝜕𝑓ℎ(.)
𝜕𝜏ℎ(.)
 ∆𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴)|𝐿𝑅 +
𝜕𝑓ℎ(.)
𝜕𝑋ℎ
 ∆𝑋ℎ|𝐿𝑅,     (7) 
where ∆𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴)|𝐿𝑅 and ∆𝑋ℎ|𝐿𝑅 are changes in 𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴) and 𝑋ℎ induced by land 
reallocation (LR), respectively. Fixing other factors 𝑋ℎ constant, the sign of changes in 
the extent of farmland rental market transactions depends on the sign of the effect of 
land reallocation on the extent of inefficiencies, that is, 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∆𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ|𝐿𝑅) =
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∆𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ −  𝐿ℎ
𝐴)|𝐿𝑅) if ∆𝑋ℎ|𝐿𝑅 = 0.  
Thus, once we control for ∆𝑋ℎ|𝐿𝑅, ∆𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴)|𝐿𝑅 will be responsible for the fact 
that different modes of land reallocation have different effects on farmland rental 
market transactions. For instance, from the above descriptive evidence, we may 
reasonably expect that the effect of imposed FSLR (ILR) is positive while the effect of 
voluntary land reallocation (VLR) is non-positive, that is, ∆𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ −  𝐿ℎ
𝐴)|𝐼𝐿𝑅 > 0 ≥ 
∆𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ −  𝐿ℎ
𝐴)|𝑉𝐿𝑅. This possibility explains why imposed FSLR and voluntary land 
reallocation may have different or even opposite impacts on farmland rental market 
transactions.   
 
5.2 Identification Strategy  
To examine our conceptual framework, we construct ?̂? as a proxy for the extent of 
inefficiencies in farmland allocation within a village after a land reallocation (𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴)). 
We estimate the effect of land reallocation on ?̂?, and the effect of  ?̂? on farmland rental 
activities. To obtain ?̂?, we follow the approach proposed by Ravallion and Walle (2006). 
Based on the derivation presented in Appendix B, we use the functional form 
?̂?(?̂?ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴) =  𝑙𝑛(?̂?ℎ
∗ ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝐿ℎ
𝐴) as a measure of the extent of inefficiencies in land 
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allocation within a village. This measure can be interpreted as a proportional land deficit 
for household h. Because our survey did not collect consumption data before the most 
recent land reallocation, we construct ?̂? only for 2002 and thus could not apply the DID 
approach. We therefore employ the IV approach.   
We first estimate the effect of FSLR and PLR on ?̂? as follows:   
?̂? = G(𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟 𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟ℎ + 𝛾𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟 𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟ℎ + 𝜸𝑿
′𝑿 + 𝜇ℎ + 𝜇𝑣 + 𝜀)    (8) 
The coefficients of interest are 𝛾𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟 and 𝛾𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟. If our conjecture is supported, 𝛾𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟 
should be positive and 𝛾𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑟 should be negative.  
 Second, we estimate the effect of ?̂? on farmland rental market transactions as 
follows: 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ = G(𝜔0 + 𝜔𝜏 ?̂? + 𝝎𝑿
′𝑿 + 𝜇ℎ + 𝜇𝑣 + 𝜀)      (9) 
The coefficient of interest is 𝜔𝜏. We expect that 𝜔𝜏 should be positive for the extent of 
rent-in activity.  
 
5.3 Estimation Results 
Table 7 presents the results from estimating Equations (8) and (9). Because we cannot 
employ a DID approach due to data limitations, we examine the effect of imposed 
FSLR by dividing the households into two subsamples, households affected by imposed 
FSLR and those never affected by imposed FSLR. We excluded households that have 
never been affected by imposed FSLR in the with-imposed-FSLR sample. Similarly, we 
excluded those households affected by imposed FSLR in the without-imposed-FSLR 
sample.  
Summary statistics for the predicted extent of the inefficiencies (ln(𝐿∗̂/𝐿𝐴)) are 
presented at the top of Table 7. The measure is based on data from 2002. Because land 
tenure cannot be transferred without land reallocation in China, the allocated land size 
in 2002 is the land size allocated in the most recent land reallocation (𝐿ℎ
𝐴). Thus, we can 
interpret the measure as the remaining proportional mismatch between desirable and 
allocated land sizes after the most recent land reallocation as of 2002. We found that the 
proportional land deficit is significantly negative among households that have never 
been affected by land reallocation, and positive among households affected by land 
reallocation.  
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The second panel in Table 7 presents the effects of land reallocation on the 
proportional land deficit. The IVFE estimates show that an additional PLR reduces the 
proportional land deficit by 73.2%, while FSLR has an insignificant influence. Once we 
exclude those households that have never been affected by imposed FSLR, the effect of 
FSLR increased from 0.142 to 0.351 in the IVFE models, although the estimates are still 
statistically insignificant. In contrast, once we exclude those households affected by 
imposed FSLR, the magnitude of the effect of FSLR becomes smaller (–0.071 in the 
IVFE model). The insignificant effect of FSLR even among households that 
experienced imposed FSLR may be because the model still mixes the effect of imposed 
FSLR with that of past voluntary FSLR. Thus, we may expect a more significant effect 
if we were able to extract only the effect of imposed FSLR, although doing so is not 
feasible given our data.    
The third panel in Table 7 presents the effect of the proportional land deficit on 
the likelihood of participating in the farmland rental market and the size of land 
transferred in the farmland rental market (the so-called rental land size). The IVFE 
models show that a 1% increase in the proportional land deficit increases the probability 
of renting in land by 0.31% and increases the rent-in land size by 1.13%. The Tobit 
estimates also demonstrate that the proportional land deficit has a significantly positive 
effect on the rent-in land.    
These results, particularly the IVFE results, are consistent with our conceptual 
framework. To describe the overall consistency between the results in Tables 3 and 7, 
for now we set aside statistical significance and focus on the values of the IVFE 
estimates. Then, the effect of an additional PLR on the rent-in land size through its 
effect on the proportional land deficit is –1.47 (= –0.732 × 2.01), which is 43% of the 
overall effect of PLR in Table 4 (–3.42). The effect of an additional FSLR on the rent-in 
land size through its effect on the land deficit is 0.285 (= 0.142 × 2.01), which is the 
20% of the overall effect of FSLR in Table 4 (1.43). Similarly, the effect of an 
additional PLR on the rent-out land size through its effect on the land deficit is 0.351 (= 
–0.732 × –0.480), which is the 90% of the overall effect of PLR in Table 4 (0.388). 
Although these simple calculations are admittedly rough, they may still imply that our 
conceptual framework explains the effect of PLR better than does the effect of FSLR.   
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5.4 Policy Discussions 
In summary, our results demonstrate that land rental market transactions are not 
sensitive to the scale of land reallocation. Imposed FSLR apparently increases land 
rental market transactions because the imposed nature of FSLR increases inefficiencies 
in farmland allocation within a village, which is readjusted in the rental markets. Thus, 
increased land rental market transactions are unnecessary and will not represent the true 
development of land rental markets. Moreover, land reallocation mostly affects relation-
specific contracting rather than arms-length contracting in the rental markets. As arms-
length contracting is a better proxy for the development of farmland rental markets, it 
appears that prohibiting land reallocation is insufficient for facilitating the development 
of land rental markets.  
    A more effective strategy may be to arrange better land certification for land 
rental market participation. In our 2002 sample, more than 70% of land contracts are 
certified only verbally (Table 2). We also found that the proportion of households 
participating in the land rental market tends to be higher within villages that arrange 
written certificates for land rental market participation than in other villages. For 
example, in villages that have issued written certificates, 20.9% of households are 
renters of farmland (6.1% are arms-length contracting) and 20.7% rent out their 
farmland (10.4% are arms-length contracting). In contrast, in those villages that have 
never used written certificates, 14.8% of households are renters of farmland (4.8% are 
arms-length contracting) and 13.3% of them rent out their farmland (3.3% are arms-
length contracting). Although our available data does not allow us to clarify the causal 
impact of issuing the written certificate on land rental market participation, the 
descriptive findings lend support to the potential of such land certification.     
 
6. Conclusions   
To facilitate the development of farmland rental markets without privatizing land 
property rights, the Chinese government has decided to restrict administrative land 
reallocation. For example, it strictly prohibited FSLR by expanding the land tenure 
contract to 30 years in 2002 (Rural Land Contract Law), and to even an unspecified long 
term in 2008 (at the third plenary meeting of the 17th Party Congress). However, while 
previous findings support that the reforms improved land tenure security and thus 
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overall land-specific investments, it is still unclear whether they actually facilitate the 
development of land rental markets. Particularly, it is concerning that some previous 
studies observed a complementary relation between administrative land reallocation and 
land rental markets.  
This paper clarifies that the complementary relation is observed because the 
imposed nature of FSLR causes increasing inefficiencies in farmland allocation, which 
are readjusted in the rental markets. On the other hand, land rental market transactions 
are insensitive to the scale of land reallocation, and PLR tends to substitute for land 
rental markets. Also, land reallocation mostly affects relation-specific contracting rather 
than arms-length contracting in rental markets. Thus, prohibiting FSLR (or even both 
modes of land reallocation) may not be adequate to facilitate the development of land 
rental markets, which are better proxied by arms-length contracting. To further develop 
the land rental market, it appears that the Chinese government needs further reforms in 
land property rights toward the direction of greater private ownership, such as better 
land certification on land rental market participation.  
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Appendix A: First-stage Estimation Results for IVEF Models 
Dependent Variable # of FSLR 
experienced 
# of PLR 
experienced 
Share of Off-
Farm Workers 
(n – 1) ave of number of crops per vill -0.028  0.302***  0.014  
(n – 1) ave of number of plots per hh 0.216***  -0.123***  0.000  
(n – 1) ave of off-farm inc per vill 0.129  -0.107  0.026*  
(n – 1) ave of share of off-farm workers 
per vill 
0.469  0.040  0.135*  
F-statistics  8.24  2.28  40.60  
Number of Observations 2,026   2,026  2,026   
 
Note: All regressions include the full set of control variables X in Equation (5). 
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Appendix B: Measuring Inefficiencies in Farmland Allocation after an Administrative 
Land Reallocation 
 
This appendix briefly describes how we obtain the measure of 𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴) in subsection 
4.2. More details are available on pages 928–932 in Ravallion and Walle (2006). We 
start by obtaining a measure of 𝐿ℎ
∗ , the consumption-efficient land allocation to each 
household. Suppose a household holding 𝐿ℎ of land is allowed to consume C(𝐿ℎ, 𝑯𝒉) 
where 𝑯𝒉 is a vector of household characteristics, and C(𝐿ℎ, 𝑯𝒉) takes the form  
𝑙𝑛𝐶ℎ = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑙𝑛𝐿ℎ + 𝒄
′𝑯𝒉 + 𝜖ℎ,        
where a, b, and c are parameters and 𝜖ℎ is an error. 𝐿ℎ
∗  is defined as the land size 
allocated to household h within a given village to maximize the village’s aggregate 
current consumption. Then, 𝐿ℎ
∗  can be expressed as a function of 𝑯𝒉 and the market 
rental price of land (λ).10 Given data on 𝑯𝒉 and λ and the estimates of a, b, c, and 𝜖ℎ, 
we may calculate the consumption-efficient land allocation to each household (𝐿ℎ
∗ ) for 0 
< b < 1 as 
𝐿ℎ
∗ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {[ln (
𝑏
λ
) + 𝒄′𝑯𝒉 + 𝜖ℎ] (1 − 𝑏)⁄ }.        
 Suppose the latest administrative land reallocation gives 𝐿ℎ
𝐴 of land to household 
h. Then, the extent of mismatch between 𝐿ℎ
∗  and 𝐿ℎ
𝐴 is assumed to have the functional 
form 𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴) =  𝜑(𝐿ℎ
∗ ) − 𝜑(𝐿ℎ
𝐴), where 𝜑(𝐿) = (𝐿𝜂 − 1) 𝜂⁄  and 𝜂 ∈ [0, 1]. Also, the 
extent of observed land rental market transactions is denoted by 𝜌(𝐿ℎ
𝑅 , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴) =  𝜑(𝐿ℎ
𝑅) −
𝜑(𝐿ℎ
𝐴), where 𝐿ℎ
𝑅  is the total size of land farming in 2002. To choose a value of 𝜂 we 
regressed 𝜌(𝐿ℎ
𝑅 , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴) on 𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴) across the entire data set for alternative values of  𝜂 at 
0.1 intervals over the [0, 1] interval. The best fit was obtained at 𝜂 = 0 (as Ravallion and 
Walle also found). Thus, we use the functional form 𝜏(𝐿ℎ
∗ , 𝐿ℎ
𝐴) =  𝑙𝑛(𝐿ℎ
∗ ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝐿ℎ
𝐴) as a 
measure of the extent of inefficiencies in land allocation. More specifically, due to the 
logarithmic form of 𝜑(𝐿), our measure represents a proportional mismatch between 𝐿ℎ
∗  
and 𝐿ℎ
𝐴.  
  
                                                          
10
 We use the village average of non-zero rents for λ because rents are often set at zero 
in a land rental between relatives. For both 𝑯𝒉 and λ, we used data from 2002, which is 
the only available consumption and land rent data in our survey.  
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Table 1. Associations between the Number of FSLR and PLR Experienced and Farmland 
Rental Market Participation 
 
    Observation 
number  
Proportion of 
households renting 
in land 
Proportion of 
households renting  
out land 
Number of FSLR 
experienced by 
households 
0 823 12.2% 8.6% 
1 545 13.8% 9.5% 
2 216 10.6% 10.2% 
3 187 19.3% 13.9% 
4 or more 284 25.4% 12.0% 
Number of PLR 
experienced by 
households 
0 1,359 16.6% 10.0% 
1 371 13.2% 8.9% 
2 152 11.8% 10.5% 
3 107 8.4% 13.1% 
4 or more 66 7.6% 9.1% 
Total Number of 
LR experienced by 
households 
  
0 294 13.9% 6.8% 
1 745 13.4% 9.4% 
2 345 12.2% 8.1% 
3 304 14.5% 14.1% 
4 or more 367 21.5% 12.0% 
 
Note: LR = land reallocation, FSLR = full-scale land reallocation, and PLR = partial land 
reallocation. 
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Table 2. Contractual Parties and Certificate in the Farmland Rental Markets in China 
 
 
All     Only FSLR   Only PLR   No LR   
 
# of HH Prop 
 
# of HH Prop 
 
# of HH Prop 
 
# of HH Prop 
Contractual Parties            
Relatives within a village 112 37.8%   73 40.1%   21 37.5%   13 35.1% 
Non-relatives within a village 86 29.1%  56 30.8%  15 26.8%  7 18.9% 
Village leaders 53 17.9%  25 13.7%  14 25.0%  12 32.4% 
Mediated by village committee 
/ village cadres  
23 7.8%  15 8.2%  2 3.6%  4 10.8% 
Relatives outside a village 1 0.3%  0 0.0%  1 1.8%  0 0.0% 
Non-relatives outside a village 7 2.4%  4 2.2%  2 3.6%  0 0.0% 
Others 14 4.7%   9 5.0%   1 1.8%   1 2.7% 
Total HH number 296     182     53     37   
Type of certificate            
Verbal promise 206 76.0%  130 79.3%  40 75.5%  24 70.6% 
Written certificate 41 15.1%  23 14.0%  10 18.9%  5 14.7% 
Others 24 8.9%  11 6.7%  3 5.7%  5 14.7% 
Total HH number 271   164   53   34  
 
Note: # = number, HH = household, and Prop = proportion. Some households did not report the type of certificate.  
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Table 3. Partial Effects of FSLR and PLR on Farmland Rental Market Transactions  
 
   Probit FE IVFE  
  Column # (1) (2)  (3) 
Rental Market Participation 
Dependent Variable = Rent in land (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
Basic Model # of FSLR experienced 0.020*** 0.023** 0.009 
 # of PLR experienced -0.018*** -0.009 -0.264* 
     
TLR Models total # of LR experienced 0.001 -0.002 0.007 
  Tobit FE IVFE 
Rent-in Land Size 
Dependent Variable = Rent-in land size (mu) 
Basic Models # of FSLR experienced 0.288* 0.349* 1.430 
 # of PLR experienced -0.284* 0.004 -3.419* 
     
TLR Models total # of LR experienced 0.021 0.076 1.389 
  Tobit FE IVFE 
Contractual Parties 
Dependent variable = Rent-in land size (mu) contracted with 
 
Relatives # of FSLR experienced 0.270*** 0.111* 0.732 
 # of PLR experienced -0.241* -0.042 -0.908 
     
Non-Relatives # of FSLR experienced 0.176* 0.035 -0.260 
 # of PLR experienced -0.031 -0.016 -1.227 
     
Village Leaders # of FSLR experienced -0.014 -0.004 0.036 
 # of PLR experienced -0.020 0.002 -0.062 
     
Number of Observations 2,026 2,026 2,026 
 
Note: (i) All regressions include the full set of control variables X in Equation (5). (ii) FE = 
the province-level fixed effects model; IVFE = the province-level fixed effects model with 
instrumental variables. (iii) Partial effects at means are reported for probit and Tobit models. 
(iv) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4. Mean Village Characteristics by the Experience of Land Reallocation  
 
Column # (1) (2) (3)  
 Only voluntary 
LR 
Imposed  
FSLR 
Difference 
(1) – (2) 
(SE) 
# of villages (n = 96) 58 38   
Nominal Means         
Village size (total # of HH) 403.28 552.21 -148.93*** (49.91) 
Distance to a prefectural city (km) 24.29 21.09 3.20 (3.34) 
Average number of crop types 
farmed per household 
2.62 2.58 0.04 (0.31) 
Number of crops types cultivated 
within a village 
1.55 1.51 0.0357 (0.21) 
Share of off-farm workers 0.28 0.22 0.06*** (0.02) 
Province dummies:      
    Hunan 0.21 0.11 0.10 (0.08) 
    Zhejiang 0.28 0.03 0.25*** (0.08) 
    Fujian 0.10 0.24 -0.13* (0.08) 
    Sichuan 0.26 0.03 0.23*** (0.07) 
    Anhui 0.03 0.37 -0.33*** (0.07) 
    Heilongjiang 0.12 0.24 -0.12 
  
(0.08) 
Means after controlling for province effects   
Village size (total # of HH) -15.45 23.58 -39.04 (40.15) 
Distance to a prefectural city (km) 0.74 -1.13 1.87 (3.17) 
Average number of crop types 
farmed per household 
-0.10 0.19 -0.30 (0.20) 
Number of crops types cultivated 
within a village 
-0.04 0.07 -0.11 (0.10) 
Share of off-farm workers 0.00 0.00 0.01 (0.01) 
 
Note: (i) LR = land reallocation, FSLR = full-scale land reallocation, HH = household. (ii) 
*** = 1% level, ** = 5% level, and * = 10% level.  
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Table 5. Mean Household Characteristics by the Experience of Land Reallocation after Controlling for Province Effects 
 
Means after controlling for province effects         
 Column # (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5)  
  No LR Imposed  
FSLR 
only 
voluntary 
LR 
Difference 
(1) – (2) 
(SE) Difference 
(1) – (3) 
(SE) 
# of households  292 775 959     
Household  Household size -0.071 0.005 0.005 -0.075 (0.089) -0.076 (0.088) 
demographics Share of working age 16-60 0.009 -0.009 0.002 0.018 (0.017) 0.006 (0.016) 
 Share of off-farm laborers -0.011 -0.009 0.013 -0.002 (0.014) -0.024 (0.015) 
Household head  HH head age -0.181 0.388 -0.467 -0.569 (0.748) 0.286 (0.749) 
Characteristics HH head high education 0.013 -0.002 -0.002 0.015 (0.013) 0.015 (0.013) 
 HH head mid education 0.014 -0.024 0.018 0.038 (0.034) -0.004 (0.033) 
 HH head low education -0.027 0.026 -0.015 -0.053 (0.034) -0.012 (0.032) 
 HH head cadre 0.013 0.005 -0.009 0.008 (0.028) 0.022 (0.028) 
Economic Status Total income per capita (yuan) -197.80 -75.57 214.85 -122.22 (417.81) -412.65 (487.52) 
 Arable land per capita (mu) 0.056 0.142 -0.142 -0.086 (0.154) 0.198** (0.084) 
 Average agri tax in 2001-2 9.248 -2.799 -1.425 12.046 (8.778) 10.672 (8.484) 
LR experiences Total # of LR -1.472 0.042 0.345 -1.514*** (0.066) -1.817*** (0.083) 
 # of FSLR -0.649 0.210 -0.003 -0.859*** (0.059) -0.646*** (0.081) 
 # of PLR -0.896 -0.164 0.367 -0.732*** (0.046) -1.263*** (0.102) 
Land rental  Rent in land (1=yes, 0=otherwise) -0.009 0.022 -0.013 -0.031 (0.025) 0.004 (0.023) 
activity Rent out land (1=yes, 0=otherwise) -0.044 -0.002 0.017 -0.042** (0.017) -0.061** (0.021) 
 
Note: (i) LR = land reallocation, FSLR = full-scale land reallocation, PLR = partial land reallocation, # = number, HH = household, and agri = 
agricultural. (ii) *** = 1% level, ** = 5% level, and * = 10% level. 
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Table 6. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Partial Effects of Imposed FSLR on Land 
Rental Market Transactions 
 
 
Compared to No Land 
Reallocation 
 
Compared to Voluntary 
Land Reallocation 
Column # (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Rental Land Size 
Dependent variable = Rent-in land size (mu) 
  Imposed FSLR indicator (iFSLR) 0.108 -0.628  0.173* -0.350** 
  After the imposed FSLR (After) 0.672 0.398  0.615*** 0.615*** 
  iFSLR*After 1.488** 1.762***  1.545*** 1.545*** 
  Province dummies and period YES YES  YES YES 
  Other control variables NO YES  NO YES 
F-statistic (p-value) 5.94 (0.0) 3.01 (0.0)  8.92 (0.0) 3.85 (0.0) 
      
Contractual Parties 
Dependent variable = Rent-in land size (mu) contracted with 
  
Relatives      
   Imposed FSLR indicator (iFSLR) 0.098 0.109  0.002 -0.071 
   After the imposed FSLR (After) 0.088 0.029  0.192*** 0.192*** 
   iFSLR*After 0.706*** 0.765***  0.603*** 0.603*** 
   Province dummies and period YES YES  YES YES 
   Other control variables NO YES  NO YES 
Non-Relatives      
   Imposed FSLR indicator (iFSLR) -0.020 -0.144  0.016 -0.047 
   After the imposed FSLR (After) 0.051 0.082  0.147*** 0.147*** 
   iFSLR*After 0.570** 0.539**  0.474*** 0.474*** 
   Province dummies and period YES YES  YES YES 
   Other control variables NO YES  NO YES 
Village Leaders      
   Imposed FSLR indicator (iFSLR) 0.025 0.070  0.017 0.025 
   After the imposed FSLR (After) 0.033 0.023  0.058*** 0.058*** 
   iFSLR*After -0.001 0.009  -0.026 -0.026 
   Province dummies and period YES YES  YES YES 
   Other control variables NO YES  NO YES 
Number of Observations 2,234 2,234  3,320 3,320 
Robustness Checks 
Dependent Variable = Rent in land  
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
Without Imposed FSLR  Without Only Voluntary 
FSLR 
Probit FE  Probit FE 
# of FSLR experienced 0.005 0.005  0.014*** 0.015 
# of PLR experienced -0.018*** -0.012  -0.019 -0.017 
      
Number of Observations 863 863  1,005 1,005 
 
Note: (i) Other control variables are the control variables X in Equation (5). (ii) ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Partial Effects and Consequences of Inefficiency in Land Allocation (Proportional 
Land Deficit)  
 
Summary statistics for 
proportional land deficit 
(ln(𝑳∗̂/𝑳𝑨)) 
 
 
No LR 
 
(1) 
Only 
voluntary LR 
(2) 
Imposed 
FSLR 
(3) 
Difference 
(1) - (2) 
Difference 
(1) - (3) 
-0.306 0.098 0.040 -0.405*** -0.346*** 
Effects of land reallocations on the proportional land deficit    
 All Sample 
(n = 1964) 
With Imposed FSLR  
(n = 1,071) 
Without Imposed 
FSLR (n = 1,179) 
 FE IVFE IVFE   IVFE  
 Dependent variable = Ln(proportional land deficit) i.e., ln(𝐿∗̂/𝐿𝐴)  
  
# of FSLR 
experienced 
0.045** 0.142 0.351   -0.071  
  
# of PLR 
experienced 
0.047*** -0.732** -0.632   -0.262*  
Effects of proportional land deficit on land rental market transactions  
  Rent In (n = 1,964)    
  Probit FE IVFE     
 Dependent variable = Indicator of Land Rental Activity (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
 Ln(proportional 
land deficit) 
0.011 0.009 0.310**     
         
  Tobit FE IVFE^     
 Dependent variable = ln(Size of land transferred in the land rental market + 0.01)  
  
Ln(proportional 
land deficit) 
- 0.075** 1.133*     
 
Note: (i) All regressions include the full set of control variables X in Equations (8) and (9). (ii) 
FE = the village-level fixed effects model; IVFE = the province-level fixed effects model 
with instrumental variables. (iii) Partial effects at means are reported for Tobit models. (iv) ^ 
indicates that the over-identification test is rejected at the 10% level. (v) ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Overview of the Effect of Prohibiting Land Reallocation on the Development of Farmland Rental Markets 
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